Meditation refers to a family of self-regulation practices that focuses on training attention and awareness to foster psycho-emotional well-being and to develop specific capacities such as calmness, clarity, and concentration. We report a prospective convenience-controlled study in which we analyzed the effect of two components of Preksha Dhyāna – buzzing bee sound meditation and color meditation on healthy college students. Mahapran and leśya dhyāna are two Preksha Dhyāna practices that are based on sound and green color, respectively. The study population (...) represents a suitable target as college students experience different stress factors during the school year. This study measures the individual and combined effects of two techniques, on short-term memory, attention, and affect, in novice meditators. We used a battery of cognitive, performance, and compared results with baseline and control values. We found improved cognition, especially attention, short-term memory, and affect in terms of positivity and reduced negativity. Overall, the two techniques produced variable benefits and subjects showed improved scores over baseline for short-term memory, cognitive function, and overall wellbeing. Further studies are required to understand underlying mechanisms for the observed differences between the two techniques and to elucidate mechanisms underlying the more pronounced and global benefits observed with the combined techniques. These results underscore a need to examine individual components of meditation practices in order to individualize treatment approaches for attention disorders in young adults.Clinical Trail Registration:ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT03779269. (shrink)

What I require is a convening of my culture's criteria, in order to confront them with my words and life as I pursue them and as I may pursue them; and at the same time to confront my words and life as I pursue them with the life my culture's words may imagine for me: to confront the culture with itself, along the lines it meets in me. Stanley Cavell.

It can seem incoherent to fully characterize fundamentality in terms of grounding, given that the fundamental is precisely that which cannot be fully characterized independently. I argue that there is no such incoherence.

This article is about a spiritual response to environmental crisis, an emerging field of ethics that joins ecology and environmentalism with the awareness of sacred within the creation2. It investigates into the Vedic texts for finding out the philosophical attitude about the earth and our spiritual obligations and responsibilities to the planet in resolving environmental issues. In the vedic-tradition3, it is the course of experiencing nature as spiritual presence and the awareness to it about our conduct as the moral and (...) rational being. It is a world view that values all that in totality is called “nature” that is, generally, taken as “other” in contrast to human, as existence or spirit. The ethics of respect to “others”, against the effects of imperialistic, ideological conflicts, religious terrorism, industrial, atomic and corporate pollutions, must be worked out as a remedy. The basic argument of spiritual ecology lies in the view that we can find no God more than the spirit abiding in all units of the globe. One must have the view of spirit as ubiquitous principle in treating with and enjoying our needs with the things that the nature permeates as gifts of his care to it. Thus, spiritual ecology of the Vedic tradition has a therapeutic importance; it helps in cultivating our conduct and overcoming the fear of a risk against living on the earth. I am of the view that the rationality of a man and that of a nation is to be determined in proportion to the cultivation and progress of attitude and treatment with “other” but not the vice versa. (shrink)

I assume that there exists a general phenomenon, the phenomenon of the explanatory gap, surrounding consciousness, normativity, intentionality, and more. Explanatory gaps are often thought to foreclose reductive possibilities wherever they appear. In response, reductivists who grant the existence of these gaps have offered countless local solutions. But typically such reductivist responses have had a serious shortcoming: because they appeal to essentially domain-specific features, they cannot be fully generalized, and in this sense these responses have been not just local but (...) parochial. Here I do better. Taking for granted that the explanatory gap is a genuine phenomenon, I offer a fully general diagnosis that unifies these previously fragmented reductivist responses. (shrink)

Naïve realism is a theory of perception with great explanatory ambitions. It has been influentially argued that, in order to realize these explanatory ambitions, the naïve realist should say that any perception belongs to just one fundamental kind. I think, however, that adopting this commitment does not particularly help the naïve realist to realize her explanatory ambitions, and so is not warranted. This result is significant because once this commitment about fundamental kinds is relinquished, we see that it is possible (...) to develop some new and surprising forms of naïve realism—most notably, what I call pluralist naïve realism. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 11, Issue 2, pp 117 - 148 The paper examines the problem of self-knowledge from the perspectives of Plotinus and the Indian Advaita school. Analyzing the subject-object relation, I show that according to both Plotinus and Advaita thinkers, full self-knowledge demands complete absence of otherness. Plotinus argues that if self-consciousness is divided into subject-object relation then one will know oneself as contemplated but not as contemplating and no real self-knowledge obtains in this case. Śaṅkara, who constitutes an (...) important representative of Advaita thought, points out that the self cannot know itself as an object because what is called an object to be known becomes established when it is separated from the self, the subject. I argue that at the level of the One, similar to the state of _ātman_ consciousness in Advaita framework, the soul experiences itself in expansive non-dual consciousness. Lastly, I examine the role of non-duality as the foundation of knowledge. (shrink)

Consider two deeply appealing thoughts: first, that we experience external particulars, and second, that what it’s like to have an experience – the phenomenal character of an experience – is somehow independent of external particulars. The first thought is readily captured by phenomenal particularism, the view that external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. The second thought is readily captured by phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never part of phenomenal character. -/- Here I (...) show that a novel version of phenomenal generalism can capture both thoughts in a satisfying fashion. Along the way, I reveal severe problems facing phenomenal particularism and also shed light on the mental kinds under which experiences fall. (shrink)

Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, action, and belief. According to my Teleological Account, all of these are epistemically successful just in case they fulfill the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The central features of the Teleological Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory posit, knowledge-centered in its insistence that knowledge sets the fundamental (...) epistemic norm, and yet fiercely pluralistic in its acknowledgment of the legitimacy and value of a rich range of epistemic norms distinct from knowledge. Largely in virtue of this pluralist character, I argue, the Teleological Account is far superior to extant knowledge-centered accounts. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a new argument for the perceptual rationality thesis: the claim that perceptual experiences themselves can be rational or irrational. In her book The Rationality of Perception, Susanna Siegel has offered several intertwined arguments for this same thesis, and, as you will see, one of Siegel’s arguments is what inspires my own. However, I will suggest that the new argument is significantly better-supported than Siegel’s original argument.

I defend a subjective representationalist theory of phenomenal experience. On this view, phenomenal experiences are simply certain kinds of representations of subjective (i.e., suitably mind-dependent) physical properties of environmental objects or of one’s body. Chapter 1 focuses on the thoroughly spatial character of experience. Here I argue against views of experience according to which phenomenal properties – roughly, the properties which constitute “what it’s like” to have an experience – are internal to the subject’s mind. If my arguments succeed, then (...) phenomenal properties are outside the subject’s mind. Representationalists typically embrace this claim. Chapter 2 quickly recapitulates some well-known motivations for representationalism and then considers an important choice point for representationalists: are phenomenal properties objective (essentially mind-independent) or subjective (essentially mind-dependent)? I introduce a robust set of inversion intuitions and argue that subjective representationalism, which holds that some phenomenal properties are subjective, can better accommodate such intuitions than objective representationalism. Chapter 3 focuses on the familiar “explanatory gap” problem. I consider a recent version of this argument which concludes that phenomenal consciousness is not reducible to the physical. Since the version of subjective representationalism I hold is part of just such an attempt to reduce phenomenal consciousness to the physical, I spend this chapter developing the resources to respond to Chalmers’ argument. Chapter 4 considers the intuition that internal twins must have precisely the same kinds of phenomenal experiences. This intuition is widespread, powerful, and recalcitrant. But it is very likely that representationalism, especially of the highly externalist sort that I defend in Chapter 1, is incompatible with such intuitions. I argue that this intuition is unreliable and attempt to debunk it. Chapter 5 very tentatively fills in some details of the subjective representationalist account. Representationalists can be sorted into first-order and higher-order theorists. Roughly, first-order representationalists hold that a ground-level representation of a certain kind suffices for phenomenal experience, while higher-order representationalists insist that phenomenal experiences also require a higher-order representation of the ground-level representations. I am tempted by the first-order view on grounds of parsimony. In this chapter, I rebut just one recent, introspectively-based argument for higher-order representationalism. (shrink)

This article discusses different conceptions and translations of the devadasi system in transnational Dalit feminist activism. I focus specifically on activist participation at the 1994 Asia Tribunal on Women’s Human Rights in Tokyo, Japan and the construction of an analogy between the experiences and struggles of devadasis and that of ‘military comfort women’, i.e. women from Japan’s former colonies who were abducted and raped by the Japanese military during World War II. I argue that strategic claims of commonality are part (...) of the process of making specific, local practices legible to a global audience and that these sorts of claims also enable transnational feminist activism and solidarity. (shrink)

Most contemporary theories of perception, including leading forms of representationalism and naive realism, are monistic: they assume that to consciously perceive is to deploy only one kind of sensory awareness. Here I instead argue for rich pluralism, which says that to consciously perceive is to deploy two very different kinds of sensory awareness in concert: representational awareness of particulars, and non-representational, partly essence-revealing awareness of sensory qualities.

What grounds facts of the form? One promising answer is: facts of the form. A different promising answer is: x itself. Isaac Wilhelm has recently argued that the second answer is superior to the first. In this paper, I rebut his argument.

In this paper, I advance a new hypothesis about what the ordinary concept of perceptual experience might be. To a first approximation, my hypothesis is that it is the concept of something that seems to present mind-independent objects. Along the way, I reveal two important errors in Michael Martin’s argument for the very different view that the ordinary concept of perceptual experience is the concept of something that is impersonally introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception. This conceptual work is significant (...) because it provides three pieces of good news for the common kind theorist. (shrink)

At present there is an enormous discrepancy between our nanotechnological capabilities (particularly our nanobiotechnologies), our social wisdom, and consensus on how to apply them. To date, cost considerations have greatly constrained our application of nanotechnologies. However, novel advances in microsystem platform technologies are about to greatly diminish that economic constraint while developing new industries. Properly used in a solid legal and ethical framework, within an educated population, these advances will vastly enrich our quality of life without being intrusive. Improperly used, (...) these technologies could lead to a modern-day Luddism, social turmoil, or possibly even to emulating those societies described in the darkest of novels. These technologies must be developed in tandem with the social and legal frameworks needed to ensure that they improve both individuals and our society. To ensure that this occurs, we need to have the ethical, legal, scientific, and engineering experts working together and with the public. (shrink)

I highlight a neglected but striking phenomenological fact about our experiences: they have a pervasively spatial character. Specifically, all (or almost all) phenomenal qualities – roughly, the introspectible, philosophically puzzling properties that constitute ‘what it’s like’ to have an experience – introspectively seem instantiated in some kind of space. So, assuming a very weak charity principle about introspection, some phenomenal qualities are instantiated in space. But there is only one kind of space – the ordinary space occupied by familiar objects. (...) And the only objects appropriately located in ordinary space are outside the subject’s mind. This entails experiential externalism, the view that at least one phenomenal quality is instantiated outside the subject’s mind. Experiential externalism is incompatible with many leading theories of experience, including certain mental paint theories; some forms of representationalism; paradigmatic versions of sense-datum theory; and views on which no phenomenal qualities are instantiated. My argument is structurally similar to familiar arguments based on the ‘transparency of experience.’ However, I suggest, phenomenological intuitions about spatiality are considerably more stable than phenomenological intuitions about transparency. For many philosophers, transparency intuitions fade markedly with respect to non-standard experiences, including experiences associated with blurry or double vision. But spatiality intuitions remain robust even for these experiences. Thus, spatiality intuitions should be more dialectically effective than transparency intuitions for supporting experiential externalism. (shrink)

In his 2009 article “Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology,” Uriah Kriegel argues for self-representationalism about phenomenal consciousness primarily on phenomenological grounds. Kriegel’s argument can naturally be cast more broadly as an argument for higher-order representationalism. I examine this broadened version of Kriegel’s argument in detail and show that it is unsuccessful for two reasons. First, Kriegel’s argument (in its strongest form) relies on an inference to the best explanation from the claim that all experiences of normal adult human beings are accompanied by (...) peripheral awareness of those very experiences to the claim that all experiences are accompanied by peripheral awareness of those very experiences. This inference is inadequately defended, for the explanandum may also be given a straightforward evolutionary explanation. Second, contra Kriegel, I argue that phenomenological investigation does not support the thesis that we are always peripherally aware of our experiences. Instead, it delivers no verdict on this thesis. Kriegel’s phenomenological mistake may be explained via a highly diluted version of the famous transparency thesis about experience. (shrink)

This paper is about Gandhi's critique of politics, of which his ambivalence towards democracy was a part. I argue that for Gandhi the ground of moral action is fearlessness, while that of political reason is security and self-defense. Gandhi sees the context of moral action in the mundane fabric of everyday life, in places such as the family and the village. For that reason he does not believe that moral action requires being supplemented by the particular kind of unity which (...) politics and the state call for and necessitate. (shrink)

According to the Epistemic Theory of Mind, knowledge is part of the best overall framework for explaining behavior at the psychological level. This theory, which has become increasingly popular in recent decades, has almost always been conjoined with an invariantist theory of “knows.” In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: the Epistemic Theory of Mind is far more explanatorily powerful when conjoined with contextualism. I conclude that if the Epistemic Theory of Mind is true, then there is (...) a powerful new reason to accept contextualism. (shrink)

I construct a tempting anti-physicalist argument, which sharpens an explanatory gap argument suggested by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson. The argument relies crucially on the premise that there is a deep epistemic asymmetry (which may be identified with the explanatory gap) between phenomenal truths and ordinary macroscopic truths. Many physicalists reject the argument by rejecting this premise. I argue that even if this premise is true, the anti-physicalist conclusion should be rejected, and I provide a detailed, physicalist-friendly explanation of the (...) relevant premise. Along the way, I sketch an account of a priori conceptual knowledge that is compatible with naturalistic accounts of intentionality. I conclude by noting that the resulting view is a version of the popular phenomenal concept strategy that avoids a potentially worrying dilemma facing earlier incarnations of this strategy. (shrink)

Representationalism is, roughly, the view that experiencing is to be analyzed wholly in terms of representing. But what sorts of properties are represented in experience? According to a prominent form of representationalism, objective representationalism, experiences represent only objective (i.e. suitably mind-independent) properties. I explore subjective representationalism, the view that experiences represent at least some subjective (i.e. suitably mind-dependent) properties. Subjective representationalists, but not objective representationalists, can accommodate cases of illusion-free phenomenal inversion. Moreover, subjective representationalism captures the so-called transparency of experience, (...) as it is standardly articulated, just as well as objective representationalism. (shrink)

Derek Allan presented a paper at the 2016 OSSA Conference at the University of Windsor; I provided comments on that paper. These are brief notes on my comments.

The impetus of this study is to gauge the nexus between economic policy uncertainty and financial innovation in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa nations for the period from 2004M1 to 2018M12. This study utilizes both the linear and non-linear autoregressive distributed lag models to evaluate the long-run and the short-run association between EPU and financial innovation; furthermore, the causal effects are investigated by following the non-Granger casualty framework. The results of long-run cointegration, i.e., the test statistics of modified (...) F-test, standard Wald test, and tBDM, reject the null hypothesis and establish the presence of the long-run association between EPU and financial innovation. Conversely, long-run asymmetry cointegration revealed the test statistics of FPSS, WPSS, and tBDM in non-linear estimation. Furthermore, both in the long run and short run, the Wald test results disclose asymmetric effects running from EPU to financial innovation. In regards to the asymmetric impact of EPU on financial innovation, this study documents that the positive and negative shocks in EPU are negatively linked with financial innovation in the long run but are insignificant for short-run effects. Besides, financial innovation measured by R&D investment exhibits a positive linkage with shocks in EPU, implying that uncertainty induces innovation in the economy. Referring to causality effects, this study divulges the feedback hypothesis, i.e., bidirectional causality prevails between EPU and financial innovation in all sample countries. (shrink)

Heidegger commentator J. L. Mehta includes in his book the following quote from Heidegger: “Der Wanderschaft in der Wegrichtung zum Fragwürdigen ist nicht Abenteur sondern Heimkehr.” Adapting this idea to the purpose of my own project in this article, I propose: Wandering on the Footpath of Freedom is both an Adventure and a Homecoming! The aim of this article is to explore the idea of freedom as it is developed in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. The strategy here is (...) to examine the salient remarks of several commentators, including Mehta, William Richardson, Werner Brock, Charles Guignon, Rüdiger Safransky, and others. Some of the ideas explored here are: transcendence, overtness, authenticity, poetry and resoluteness. (shrink)

In this commentary on Neil Mehta's excellent book, A Pluralist Theory of Perception, I argue that Mehta's commitments lead to dualism. To this end, I give three arguments against physicalism that centrally rely on claims Mehta accepts. Since the relevant claims are highly plausible, the three arguments give everyone, not just Mehta, reason to reject physicalism.

ABSTRACT‘What it is like’ is a popular philosophical locution to talk about conscious experiences, but how it manages to refer to conscious experiences is still under investigation. What’s remarkable about ‘what it is like’ is that its literal meaning doesn’t concern consciousness; nevertheless this phrase is popular in discourses about consciousness. Understanding ‘what it is like’ thus requires investigation into the contextual factors that guide the interpretation of ‘what it is like’, which have not been sufficiently explored. This paper aims (...) at understanding the context of ‘what it is like’, based on a revised property account of its semantics. After criticising Stoljar’s account in terms of ‘stereotypical contexts’, I consider several contextual factors that can be discerned in Stoljar’s interpretation of Nagel’s definition of consciousness. Then, I consider and criticise Mehta’s proposal that the meaning of ‘what it is like’ is fixed by mentioning the hard problems of consciousness. Eventually, I propose that the meaning of ‘what it is like’ is fixed by Phenomenal Thinking Context, in which the audience is made to think in the way in which one typically thinks about experiences. I also argue that Phenomenal Thinking Context explains the popularity of ‘what it is like’. (shrink)

El presente artículo examina la concepción del sujeto en el pensamiento de Jean Paul Sartre. Dicho examen se lleva a cabo, por motivos históricos y conceptuales, apelando directa e indirectamente a la filosofía de Heidegger, Husserl, et.al., siendo éste último el bastión, alterno a Sartre mismo, más importante para el desarrollo del presente texto. Así, dicho análisis del concepto de sujeto, y de sus implicaciones y conceptualizaciones fenomenológicas, se lleva a cabo a través del estudio de varias formas de conciencia: (...) la conciencia del objeto, referida a algo distinto de sí misma, y la conciencia de sí, que, al mismo tiempo, se dice de dos formas distintas, a saber: 1. Como conciencia refleja, no reflexiva; y 2. Como conciencia reflexiva. Gracias a esta distinción y análisis de conceptos como Yo, conciencia y sujeto, Sartre se convierte en un crítico de la filosofía moderna del sujeto y, como consecuencia de ello, con el pensamiento sartreano se llega a la convicción de que lo único real es la conciencia, no el mero Yo. Por tanto, el tratamiento husserliano de la conciencia –que Sartre compartirá-, entendida ésta como una constante actividad intencional, devendrá, necesariamente, en el primado del sujeto, pues el sentido de los fenómenos se origina, finalmente, en él. (shrink)

¿Cómo conceptualizar la temporalidad? ¿Qué analítica puede inteligir su carácter inefable? ¿Dónde reside la potencia heurística capaz de dar cuenta de la experimentación de su multiplicidad? Este artículo intentará poner en valor las herramientas elaboradas por la filosofía modal de V. Jankélévitch, a fines de contribuir a la tarea de arquitecturar una "episteme de la intuición" del tiempo presente. Si antes de Bergson la experiencia del tiempo había quedado ligada a la fijación de un concepto, Jankélévitch, proseguirá el trabajo de (...) su maestro, poniendo en foco el dominio disímil de "las maneras" en las que el tiempo se vivencia subjetivamente y se experimenta con-otros. Para ello, creará nociones capaces de indagar cualitativamente un dominio complejo, fugaz e irreversible, surcado por experiencias diversas, singulares, intransferibles. Así, la sutil elaboración efectuada por Jankélévitch en las nociones del "Yo-no-sé-qué" y el "Casi-nada", devendrá aquí la puerta de entrada a este mundo en movimiento, constituido por saberes que se producen siempre de modo fragmentario, "semi-gnosis" como caracterizará Jankélévitch, visto que atienden a una intelección "intuitiva" de la temporalidad, cuya capacidad heurística sobre nuestros modos de producción de la subjetividad sin duda puede sumar un aporte a las perspectivas de la filosofía contemporánea. How to conceptualize temporality? Which analytics can understand its ineffable character? Where does the heuristic strength capable of accounting an experimentation of its multiplicity lie? The aim of this article is to bring in value the tools developed by the modal philosophy of V. Jankélévitch, in order to contribute to the task of building an architecture for an "episteme of intuition" of present time. If before Bergson the experience of time had been linked to the setting of a concept, Jankélévitch will continue the work of his master, putting in focus the dissimilar domain of "ways" in which the time is subjectively lived and experienced with-others. To affront this challenge, he will propose notions capable to qualitatively inquire a complex domain, fugacious and irreversible, marked by diverse experiences, unique, non-transferable ones. Thus, the subtle elaboration made by Jankélévitch on the notions of "I-don't-know-what" and the "Almost-nothing", will become here the entrance gate to this moving world, constituted by a production of knowledge that always occurs in a fragmentary way, "semi-gnosis" as Jankélévitch's would characterize, as it serves to an "intuitive" intellection of temporality, whose heuristic capability on our modes of production of subjectivity can definitely contribute to the perspectives of the contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Om Blandt andet kampen mod bahāʼī i Iran, og om fundamentalismens tankegange, som er bange for kvinder, hvis de ikke er det svage og det tredje køn i samfundet, derfor undertrykker de dem og begrænser deres rettigheder.

On many occasions, individuals are able to coordinate their actions. The first empirical evidence to this effect has been described by Schelling (1960) in an informal experiment. His results were corroborated many years later by Mehta et al. (1994a,b) and Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997). From the point of view of mainstream game theory, the success of individuals in coordinating their actions is something of a mystery. If there are two or more strict Nash equilibria, mainstream game theory has no (...) means of explaining why people tend to choose their part of one and the same equilibrium. Textbooks (see, e.g., Rasmusen, 1989 and Kreps, 1990) refer to the fact that players may use focal points (see Schelling (1960)) or social conventions (see Lewis (1969)). Both notions cannot easily be incorporated into mainstream game theory, however. The notion of social conventions has recently been extensively studied in the context of evolutionary game theory where a population of agents interacts with each other. The central focus of this paper, however, is on situations where a few players play a game only once and I study how they may coordinate their actions. (shrink)

It is perhaps no accident that one of the finest books to appear on Heidegger in any language should come to us from the East. Mehta’s book was first published in India. The present Harper & Row edition constitutes chapters I, VIII, IX and X of that volume, the chapters devoted to Being and Time in the original having been omitted. That decision can only be regretted because, if the chapters on Being and Time are of the same quality (...) as those here published, they should be made available to us. What we have in fact then is a study of the later Heidegger, preceded by an introductory analysis of Heidegger’s method and language. Mehta’s scholarship is exhaustive, his numerous and lengthy notes touching upon all the major sources in the literature. His interpretation is so incisive that it is no exaggeration to place this book along with the works of Poeggeler and Marx among the outstanding studies of Heidegger’s thought. There is a great need for a thorough and reliable treatment of the later Heidegger in a readable English and Mehta’s book fills the bill.—J. D. C. (shrink)

One of the central difficulties for practitioners of cognate disciplines like comparative political theory and comparative philosophy concerns the hermeneutic problem of understanding that which is different. The philosophical challenge, put briefly, is this: Is it possible to bring something of an entirely different order into our world of understanding without imposing our own epistemological categories and civilizational prejudices on it? This essay focuses on recent exemplary work in comparative political theory that has explicitly grappled with this issue. Examined here (...) are three models of encountering and learning from different traditions of thought—the models of existential immersion, conversion, and pilgrimage—as exemplified in the contributions by Farah Godrej, Leigh Jenco, and J. L. Mehta. The essay shows that while the first two authors have sought to resolve the problem of the encounter with difference methodologically (Godrej) and epistemologically (Jenco), their respective solutions remain implicitly bound to a spectator theory of knowledge. This becomes especially evident when their work is contrasted with Mehta’s own. Unlike Godrej and Jenco, Mehta does not view difference as a problem to be resolved. The advantage of his approach, I argue, is that it provides liberation from the rigid subject-object dichotomy which encourages the view that the ‘objects’ of our knowledge exist prior to and wholly apart from the act of knowing. Mehta’s work, therefore, opens the possibility for redirecting our attention to a question that has thus far been thoroughly avoided in the consolidation of the subfield: the question of the very constitution of difference or heterology. (shrink)

For patients under anesthesia, it is extremely important to be able to ascertain from a scientific, third person point of view to what extent consciousness is correlated with specific areas of brain activity. Errors in accurately determining when a patient is having conscious states, such as conscious perceptions or pains, can have catastrophic results. Here, I argue that the effects of (at least some kinds of) anesthesia lend support to the notion that neither basic sensory areas nor the prefrontal cortex (...) (PFC) is sufficient to produce conscious states. I also argue that it this is consistent with and supportive of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness. I therefore disagree in some ways with Mehta and Mashour (2013), who argue that evidence from anesthesia mainly favors a first-order representational (FOR) theory, as opposed to HOT theory (and many other theories, for that matter). (shrink)

Many arguments against naïve realism are arguments against its corollary: disjunctivism. But there is a simpler argument—due to Mehta —that targets naïve realism directly. In broad strokes, the argument is the following. There are certain experiences that are, allegedly, in no way phenomenally similar. Nevertheless, naïve realism predicts that they are phenomenally similar. Hence, naïve realism is false. Mehta and Ganson successfully defend this argument from an objection raised by French and Gomes :451–460, 2016). However, all parties to (...) this dispute have missed the real problem with Mehta’s argument. As I see it, the real problem is twofold. First, despite his claims to the contrary, the experiences Mehta cites are phenomenally similar. Moreover, finding experiences that are in no way phenomenally similar turns out to be a difficult task. Second, there are motivated versions of naïve realism that are immune to Mehta’s argument. The upshot is that even if Mehta’s argument is sound, the most that it can show is that one version of naïve realism is false. (shrink)

Articles on the understanding of philosophy with special reference to Islamic teachings; includes theories of noted philosophers.